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  Society welfare plays essential role on supporting poor and low income deciles governments 
normally pay subsidies on different goods to decrease the prices and as a result, increase 
purchasing power. However, due to lack of a good target, the relatively rich and high income 
deciles benefit more than the poor from subsidies do. Therefore, it seems necessary to design 
self-targeted safety-net programs and targeted subsidies. The primary objective of this study is 
to investigate the welfare consequences of self-targeted subsidies. In other words, this study 
tries to find out whether or not transferring one unit of subsidies paid on the subsidized goods 
mostly used by the rich to the nonsubsidized goods mostly used by the poor improves social 
welfare. For this purpose, using Atkinson social welfare function, we calculated the change in 
social welfare caused by self-targeted subsidies. The results show that self-targeted subsidies 
increase social welfare. The extent of this increase is negatively related to inequality aversion 
parameter, while positively related to the share of nonsubsidized goods in low income deciles 
budget.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Adoption of a multidimensional method to deprivation applies the challenge of getting insight on the 
interaction between different dimensions (Atkinson, 1998, 2003). According to Adams (2000), food 
subsidy programs such as bread are under increasing criticism in most developing countries due to 
large contributions to government budget deficits (Salevurakis & Abdel-Haleim, 2008). Many believe 
food subsidies may influence government’s budget and increases poverty (Ali & Adams, 1996). 
Alderman and Lindert (1998) reported some evidences from two self-targeting programs, one in 
South Africa and one in Tunisia on subsidy programs. They explained that although self-targeting 
could clearly improve the distribution of food subsidies to the poorest members of society, its power 
to reduce poverty was limited by preference patterns.    1532
2. The proposed study 
 
According to Atkinson (1998, 2003), social welfare (W) is defined as follows, 
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(1)  
where Mh,nh and H represent income, family size, the number of family in population, respectively. In 
addition, ε represents the inequality aversion parameter. When ε = 1, Eq. (1) becomes as follows, 
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(2)  
The utility function of this paper is stated as follows, 
 
  ,, hh h h UU x x x  123,  (3)  
 
where  12 3 , a n d hh h x xx represent gas, sugar and beans, respectively. The proposed study of this paper 
uses indirect utility function defined as follows, 
 
 P M V V h h ,  ,  (4)  
 
where P represent price. Social welfare for each family can be stated as follows, 
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Let  h  be the marginal social utility of household income of h. Therefore, we have  
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where I = 1,2,3 represent gas, sugar and beans, respectively. There are two assumptions with our 
investigations. First, the change on the price of gas and sugar will not change the ratio of P2/P1 and 
the second assumption assumes the total amount welfare is constant, i.e., 
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where r2 and r1 represent social welfare paid for sugar and gas, respectively. Generally, the social 
welfare is paid according to the following relationship, 
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where ci and pi represent the cost of items before and after welfare program, respectively. The welfare 
of item i for family h is defined as follows, 
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In addition, the portion of each family from social welfare is characterized as follows, 
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Therefore, we have,  
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and  
 
33 12 2
12 3
11 1 12 13 1
..
HH H
hh hh h h
hh h
dp dr dp dp dr
Wx x x
dr dr dr dr dr
 
 
    
        
      
 
(12)  
Using the relationships stated previously we have 
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1 . A standard model for estimating demand is as follows, 
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For each family, we may write the equation as follows, 
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Total amount of welfare paid for commodity i  is calculated as follows, 
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(18)  
 
Therefore, total amount of welfare paid to all three commodities are calculated as follows, 
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Besides, the changes of welfare paid is calculated as follows, 
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Since ΔS = 0 therefore we have, 
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(21)  
and since government does not pay subsidy for beans, i.e. r3 = 0, we have  
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Substituting r3 = 0 yields 
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The rate of changes of beans respect to sugar is calculated as follows, 
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 3. The results 
 
In this section, we present details of our findings on testing the historical data. Table 1 shows details 
of some basic statistics on shares of three basic foods, i.e. gas, sugar and beans. 
 
Table 1 
The summary of some basic statistics 
Year  Shares of family income on Gas  Shares of family income on Sugar  Shares of family income on Beans 
1988  0.05  0.007  0.006 
1989 0.04  0.006  0.010 
1990  0.06  0.008  0.013 
1991 0.06  0.007  0.011 
1992  0.010  0.010  0.011 
1993 0.166  0.016  0.009 
1994  0.237  0.039  0.019 
1995 0.109  0.011  0.013 
1996  0.143  0.014  0.009 
1997 0.070  0.006  0.003 
1998  0.083  0.007  0.005 
1999 0.077  0.007  0.006 
2000  0.090  0.006  0.006 
2001 0.118  0.006  0.006 
2002  0.0124  0.022  0.006 
2003 0.177  0.009  0.007 
2004  0.158  0.006  0.005 
2005 0.199  0.006  0.006 
2006  0.202  0.006  0.007 
2007 0.212  0.019  0.009 
 
The proposed study of this paper gathers the same information over the same period mentioned in 
Table 1 and the following regression analysis is performed. 
 
12 3 1 4 2 5 3 1, 2,3 iii i ri ri ri waa m a p a p a p u i       (28)  
The first step to perform the regression statistics is to make sure that the data are stationary and this is 
confirmed through Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Table 3 shows details of ADF test. 
 
Table 3 
The summary of ADF test 
Variable  w1 w 2  w3 p1r P2r P3r  m 
Statistics  -5.25  -5.96  -4.97  -3.54  -3.41  -2.93  -6.07 
Critical  value  -1.96  -1.96  -1.96  -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 -1.96 
 
The results of Table 3 clearly show that all variables become stationary after taking one difference 
between variables. In addition, Engle-Granger cointegration test has been applied on residuals and 
Table 4 shows the results of our survey. 
 
Table 4 
The summary of Engle-Granger cointegration test 
Statistics e1 e 2 e 3 
Value  -5.6  -4.71  -4.51 
Critical  value  -4.32 -4.32 -4.32 
  
Eq. (29) to Eq. (31) demonstrate the results of regression estimation. 
 
11 2 3 ˆ 0.03 0.009 0.01 0.002 0.01 rr r wm p p p       (29)  
21 2 3 ˆ 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.0005 0.001 rr r wm p p p       (30)  
31 2 3 ˆ 0.014 0.005 0.003 0.0005 0.0003 rrr wm p p p     (31)    1536
In our study, we considered year 2007 prices for gas and sugar as a basis for estimation and Table 5 
shows details of the prices. 
 
Table 5 
The summary of prices of gas and sugar 
Commodity   Subsidized price  Non-subsidized price  Social welfare rate 
Gas  1000  4545  0.78 
Sugar 2000  5670  0.65 
 
Using Eq. (27), the changes of beans respect to sugar is 
3
2
379.64
dr
dr
 . Table 6 demonstrates the 
change on social welfare based on various values of ε. 
 
Table 6 
The summary of change on social welfare 
ε  ε = 0  ε = 1  ε = 1.5  ε = 2 



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
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M H
W
 
4.463  0.453  0.254  0.124 
 
The results of Table 6 show that social welfare for the first four groups of people is increased while 
the social welfare for the rest of groups is reduced. In other words, the results indicate that poor 
people may benefit from the changes of the prices.  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
During the past few years, there have been different discussions in Iranian society on eliminating any 
subsidy programs especially on energy and some basic foods such as sugar and beans. This study has 
examined the effect of change on prices of gas and sugar on social welfare. The results of our survey 
have indicated that the program could reduce the gap between rich and poor people. In other words, 
social welfare for the first four groups of people has been increased while the social welfare for the 
rest of groups was reduced. In other words, the results indicate that poor people may benefit from the 
changes of the prices. The results show that self-targeted subsidies increase social welfare. The extent 
of this increase is negatively related to inequality aversion parameter, while positively related to the 
share of nonsubsidized goods in low income deciles budget. 
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